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Judicial Clarification of a Common-
Law Doctrine: The Pennsylvania
Doctrine of Official Immunity
I. Introduction
In Mayle v. Pennsylvania Department of Highways, 1 the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court abolished the doctrine of sovereign immu-
nity.2 The General Assembly responded to this decision3 by
enacting a comprehensive tort claims act (Act 152). 4 The Act rein-
states the Commonwealth's immunity from suit, except in certain
narrowly defined areas.5 While the Act clearly places limits on the
Commonwealth's liability it is less definite in establishing a standard
of immunity applicable to Commonwealth officials and employees in
a civil action for damages.6
Early common law furnished only limited immunity to Penn-
sylvania's public officials. The immunity was tailored "to prevent an
excess of caution, based upon considerations of personal liability
.* . from influencing a decision requiring the exercise of judg-
ment."7 Consequently, immunity was restricted to the performance
of a discretionary act8 and, therefore, personal liability would not
1. 479 Pa. 384, 388 A.2d 709 (1978).
2. "To be distinguished from the constitutionally-based doctrine of sovereign immunity
in Pennsylvania is the common-law concept of 'official immunity.'" Freach v. Common-
wealth, 471 Pa. 558, 567, 370 A.2d 1163, 1168 (1977).
The court in Mayle v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Highways, 479 Pa. 384, 388 A.2d 709 (1978),
did not address official immunity and should not, therefore, be deemed to have affected the
doctrine. See, e.g., Greenfield v. Vesella, 457 F. Supp. 316 (W.D. Pa. 1978).
3. The specific proposal encompassed in Act 152 was introduced prior to the Aayle
decision. To fully clarify the legislature's intent and position on sovereign immunity, however,
an amendment was prepared to specifically respond to layle. REPUBLICAN RESEARCH
GROUP, GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE COMMW. OF PA., SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 32 (1978).
4. The act is codified in several locations. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 2310, 761(2),
761(c), 762(a)(1), 931(2)(c), 931(d), 5101(b), 5110, 5111, 5522(a) (Purdon Supp. 1979-80).
5. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 51 10(a)(l)-(8) (Purdon Supp. 1979). See note 112 infra.
6. This comment will address only the immunity applicable in the context of a com-
mon-law tort. For an analysis of the official's liability for constitutional violations, see Freed,
Executive Official Immunityfor Constitutional Violations. An Analysis and Critique, 72 Nw. U.
L. REV. 526 (1977); Theis, Official Immunity and the CivilRights Act, 38 LA. L. REV. 281
(1978); Note, Federal Executive Immunity from Civil Liability in Damages. A Reevaluation of
Barr v. M1atteo, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 625 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Federal Executive Immu-
nit,].
7. Ammlung v. Platt, 224 Pa. Super. Ct. 47, 52, 302 A.2d 491, 494 (1973).
8. A discretionary act is characterized by "personal deliberation, decision and judg-
ment." W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 132 at 988 (4th ed. 1974). See
result from an official's negligent performance of a discretionary
act.9 Liability could be imposed, however, when the official's con-
duct was malicious, wanton, or reckless.' °
The present formulation of official immunity" differs signifi-
cantly from the doctrine fashioned at common law. Entitlement to
immunity is determined by an official's high or low status, rather
than by the functional necessity of immunity.' 2 Although neither
class of officials has been defined with certainty, a "high level" offi-
cial is deemed absolutely immune from suit'3 and "low level" offi-
cials are entitled to a modified version of the limited immunity
granted at common law. 4
generally 5A L. FRUMER, R. BENOIT, M. FRIEDMAN & L. PILGRIM, PERSONAL INJURY § 1.03
(1967). Essentially, the term is used to recognize the legislative or quasi-judicial nature of
certain official duties. Discretionary acts are thus deemed to merit unique judicial treatment.
In Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), for example, Chief Justice Marshall,
speaking in a different context, stated, "Where the head of a department acts in a case, in
which executive discretion is to be exercised . . . any application to a court to control, in any
respect, his conduct, would be rejected without hesitation." Id at 170-71.
Use of the term, however, has been criticized. It is impossible to distinguish, in all cases,
acts that are discretionary from those that are not. Moreover, many officials perform both
discretionary and nondiscretionary functions. Gray, Private Wrongs of Public Servants, 47
CALIF. L. REV. 303, 324 (1955). See generally Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers:
Damage Actions, 77 HARV. L. REV. 209, 219 (1963).
Attempts have been made to refine the distinction by classifying as discretionary an act
done in the performance of a policy-making duty. See Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15,
35-36 (1953); Griffin v. United States, 500 F.2d 1059 (3d Cir. 1974). Consideration has also
been given to the impact that liability could have on the future performance of the particular
function at issue. See Carter v. Carlson, 447 F.2d 358, 362 (D.C. Cir. 1971), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom., District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418 (1973).
9. See Burton v. Fulton, 49 Pa. 151 (1865); Yealy v. Fink, 43 Pa. 212 (1862); Ammlung
v. Platt, 224 Pa. Super. Ct. 47, 302 A.2d 491 (1973); Schwinn v. Gordon, 134 Pa. Super. Ct. 422,
3 A.2d 926 (1939); Waters v. Evans, 47 Pa. D. & C.2d 419 (C.P. Phila. 1969), aft'dper curiam,
218 Pa. Super. Ct. 141, 279 A.2d 286 (1971); Salus & Son, Inc. v. Kohn, 38 Pa. D. & C. 401
(C.P. Phila. 1940). See generally American Pavement Co. v. Wagner, 139 Pa. 623, 21 A. 160
(1891).
10. Burton v. Fulton, 49 Pa. 151 (1865); Yealy v. Fink, 43 Pa. 212 (1862). See notes 33-38
and accompanying text infra. In many jurisdictions an official enjoys immunity for his discre-
tionary acts provided that he acted within the scope of his authority and his actions were not
malicious, wanton, or reckless. See, e.g., Steibitz v. Mahoney, 144 Conn. 443, 134 A.2d 71
(1957); Simon v. Heald, 359 A.2d 666 (Del. Super. Ct. 1976); Young v. Hansen, 118 Ill. App.
2d 1, 249 N.E.2d 300 (1969); Robinson v. Board of County Comm'rs, 262 Md. 342, 278 A.2d 71
(1971). See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 8, at 989 n.96.
For a variation on the "malicious, wanton, or reckless" standard, see Butz v. Economou,
438 U.S. 478 (1978); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975); Scheurer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S.
232 (1974). These cases permit an immunity in damage actions brought under the Civil Rights
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970), qualified by a requirement that the official acted in good faith
and reasonably in light of the circumstances.
11. See note 25 infra.
12. Immunity is functional in that it is designed to protect particular activities of govern-
ment rather than a particular official or class of officials. Immunity is directed at the activities
most susceptible to impairment as a result of the fear of personal liability. Federal Executive
Immunity, supra note 6, at 640 n.95.
13. See notes 68-71 and accompanying text infra. The term "absolute immunity" is mis-
leading. In its purest form it is a complete bar to suit but because no guidelines exist for
determining, in all cases, entitlement to absolute immunity, the determination to grant immu-
nity is subject to varied interpretations. See notes 142-43 and accompanying text infra.
14. See Lehnig v. Felton, 235 Pa. Super. Ct. 100, 340 A.2d 564 (1975), vacated, 481 Pa.
557, 393 A.2d 302 (1978); Walter v. Commonwealth, 23 Pa. Commw. Ct. 97, 350 A.2d 440
Two recent developments in the doctrine of official immunity
have engendered speculation concerning its status in Pennsylvania.
Act 152 expressly incorporates the common-law doctrine of official
immunity.'" In Dubree v. Commonwealth, 6 however, decided after
the enactment of Act 152,17 the supreme court narrowly construed
the doctrine and held that an official's status is an inappropriate ba-
sis for determining entitlement to immunity. 8 Instead, the court
stated that the determinative factor should be the purpose of immu-
nity.' 9 If granting immunity will not promote public policy, immu-
nity will not be extended.
2 0
Despite the apparent inconsistency between the legislature's en-
dorsement of official immunity in Act 152 and the court's recent pro-
nouncement on the subject, the approach fashioned in Dubree
should not be totally disregarded. The Dubree opinion represents an
attempt to explicate the underlying policy basis supporting official
immunity.2' Moreover, the decision is the court's first opportunity to
directly22 address the question of official immunity since lower court
modification of the doctrine.2 3 This comment, therefore, reconsiders
the purposes of the doctrine and reevaluates judicial decisions on
(1976); Brungard v. Hartman, 12 Pa. Commw. Ct. 477, 315 A.2d 913 (1974), rev'd, 483 Pa. 200,
394 A.2d 1265 (1978); Dubree v. Commonwealth, 8 Pa. Commw. Ct. 567, 303 A.2d 530 (1973),
vacaled, 481 Pa. 540, 393 A.2d 293 (1978). These lower court decisions were reversed by cases
decided after the enactment of Act 152. See note 17 and accompanying text infra.
15. "An official of. the Commonwealth agency or a member of the General Assembly or
the judiciary may assert on his own behalf, or the Commonwealth may assert on his behalf,
defenses which have heretofore been available to such officials." 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 51 10(b)(1) (Purdon Supp. 1979). For a discussion of the Act, see notes 101-55 and accompa-
nying text infra.
The "Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act," 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5311.101-.803
(Purdon Supp. 1979-80), contains a similar provision applicable to employees of political sub-
divisions. Id § 5311.302(1).
16. 481 Pa. 540, 393 A.2d 293 (1978).
17. Act 152 became effective on September 28, 1978. The provisions of the Act are retro-
active to July 13, 1978, one day before the supreme court decided Mayle v. Pennsylvania Dep't
of Highways, 479 Pa. 384, 388 A.2d 709 (1978). Since the right to sue the Commonwealth was
nonexistent prior to the Mayle decision, "Act 152 neither impairs a contractual obligation nor
disturbs a vested right." Kastner v. Pennsylvania Dep't ofTransp., - Pa. Commw. Ct. -, -, 405
A.2d 1133, 1134 (1979). Despite its retroactive effect, therefore, the Act is constitutional.
Brungard v. Hartman, - Pa. Commw. Ct. -, 405 A.2d 1089 (1979).
Dubree v. Commonwealth, 481 Pa. 540, 393 A.2d 293 (1978), was decided on October 5,
1978. The Dubree panel neither referred to Act 152, nor expressly overruled prior decisions
defining official immunity.
18. 481 Pa. 540, 543, 393 A.2d 293, 294 (1978).
19. Id See notes 176-94 and accompanying text infra.
20. 481 Pa. 540, 546, 393 A.2d 293, 296 (1978). See note 176 and accompanying text
infra.
21. See note 12 and accompanying text supra.
22. In Freach v. Commonwealth, 471 Pa. 558, 370 A.2d 1163 (1977), the court concluded
that it need not determine whether the particular defendants were immune under the common-
law doctrine. The court reasoned that section 603 of the Mental Health and Mental Retarda-
tion Act of 1966, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 4603 (Purdon 1978), superseded common-law im-
munity when the injury complained of was caused while the official was acting pursuant to the
statute.
23. See notes 79-81 and 86-99 and accompanying text infra.
official immunity in Pennsylvania. Pertinent sections of Act 152 as
well as the supreme court's decision in Dubree v. Commonwealth
24
will be examined.
II. The Purpose of Official Immunity
The cornerstone of official immunity25 is the absolute immunity
granted to English judges at common law26 and subsequently
adopted in the United States. 27 This immunity rests on the proposi-
tion that "proper administration of justice [requires] that a judicial
officer. . be free to act upon his own convictions, without appre-
hension of personal consequences to himself. ' 28 Immunity is there-
fore deemed necessary to preserve an independent judiciary
unhampered by numerous lawsuits.29
Similar reasoning is advanced as justification for the extension
of some degree of immunity to public officials.3" Effectively func-
tioning government largely depends upon the ability of its officials to
24. 481 Pa. 540, 393 A.2d 293 (1978).
25. There is a tendency to use the term "official immunity" interchangeably with legisla-
tive or judicial immunity. Although the justification for immunity may be the same, the types
of official immunity are distinct. Legislative immunity holds constitutional status in the
United States. "[Flor any Speech or Debate in either House [of Congress, members] shall not
be questioned in any other place." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6. Members of the Pennsylvania
General Assembly are similarly protected. PA. CONST. art. 2, § 15.
Judicial immunity was fashioned by the courts. Judges acting within the scope of their
jurisdiction and in an official capacity are immune despite allegations of a malicious or corrupt
motive. See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978); Alzua v. Johnson, 231 U.S. 106 (1913);
Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1872). Judicial immunity has been extended to
justices of the peace, prosecutors, grand jurors, and witnesses. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S.
478, 510 (1978). See generally Yaselli v. Goff, 12 F.2d 396 (2d Cir. 1926), a7'd per curiam 275
U.S. 503 (1927); Gray, supra note 8, at 312-13. But cf. Reese v. Danforth, - Pa. ., 406 A.2d 735
(1979) (public defender is not a "public official" entitled to immunity).
26. See Floyd v. Barker, 77 Eng. Rep. 1305 (1607). The immunity was originally justi-
fied to protect the King. Id at 1307.
27. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978); Alzua v. Johnson, 231 U.S. 106 (1913);
Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1871).
28. Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 347. See generally Jennings, Tort Liability
of Administrative Officers, 21 MINN. L. REV. 263 (1937).
29. But see Gray, supra note 8, at 310-11 (recognizing the need to immunize mistakes in
judgment but criticizing absolute immunity because it forecloses inquiry into allegations of
corrupt or malicious acts). The adversary process, the possibility of appellate review, and the
good behavior requirement for continued tenure may, however, prevent abuse of the immu-
nity. Handler & Klein, The Defense of Privilege in Defamation Suits Against Government Exec-
utive Officials, 74 HARV. L. REV. 44, 54 (1960).
30. See generally Davis, Administrative Officers' Tort Liability, 55 MICH. L. REV. 201
(1956). There is virtual unanimity that an official performing a discretionary function should
be protected by some degree of immunity. See 3 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE
§ 26.01 (Supp. 1970). There is disagreement, however, whether absolute or a more limited
immunity is appropriate.
The federal courts' approach had been to extend absolute immunity provided the official
acted within "the outer perimeter of [his] line of duty." Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 575
(1959). In Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978), however, the Court narrowly construed
Barr and declined to extend absolute immunity to all executive level officials for an alleged
civil rights violation. The Butz decision may signal a closer scrutiny of the rights at stake and
the nature and degree of authority exercised by executive employees before immunity will be
granted by the federal courts.
take decisive action. This ability would be seriously impaired, how-
ever, if an official were subjected to personal liability for a govern-
mental decision that is subsequently deemed erroneous.3' Thus,
immunity is an appropriate means of insuring the performance of
duties requiring the exercise of judgment.
III. The Pennsylvania Doctrine of Official Immunity
A. Original Formulation - Protection of Discretionary Acts
The early decisions on official immunity are consistent with the
purpose that immunity was intended to serve.32 In Yea/y v. Fink,33
the defendants, township supervisors, were charged with the respon-
sibility of building a roadway. The plaintiff sued to recover property
damage sustained as a consequence of the defendants' decision to
construct a causeway rather than a bridge. Recovery was denied be-
cause the plaintiff failed to allege that the defendants acted with a
malicious intent.34 Implicit in the court's reasoning, however, was
the belief that the defendants should not be subject to liability for
their decision regarding the most suitable method for completing the
roadway.35 This position was reaffirmed in Burton v. Fulton.36 In
Burton, immunity was invoked to deny recovery to a plaintiff who
was dismissed, apparently without cause, from her position as a
school principal. The court reasoned that the school directors had
acted "within the undoubted scope of their authority"37 in displacing
the plaintiff and would not, therefore, be subject to liability unless
malice was proved.38
Several lower court decisions are in accord with the position ar-
ticulated by the supreme court in Yea/y and Burton. 39 The disallow-
31. Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 571-73 (1959). Officials would be deterred from per-
forming their duties and would, instead, focus their efforts on avoiding liability. Id See Gre-
goire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949 (1950).
32. See notes 7 and 31 and accompanying text supra.
33. 43 Pa. 212 (1862).
34. Id at 216-17. The plaintiff sued the defendants because the causeway interfered with
the flow of water to his mill.
35. "[T]ownship officers are not personally liable for acts done honestly in the exercise of
the discretion which the law gives them." Id at 215.
36. 49 Pa. 151 (1865).
37. Id at 154.
38. Id at 154-55.
39. In Meads v. Rutter, 122 Pa. Super. Ct. 64, 184 A. 560 (1936), however, the superior
court decided a case without addressing Yeaiy or Burton. A Commonwealth employee was
held liable for damages sustained as a consequence of his negligent operation of a snow plow.
The court rejected the immunity defense, stating that "[a]n employee or officer of the common-
wealth is not a member of a privileged class---exempt from liability for his individual
tort. . . .Like all others he must personally answer for his wrongful acts." Id at 69, 184 A. at
562.
In Ammlung v. Platt, 224 Pa. Super. Ct. 47, 302 A.2d 491 (1973), the superior court recon-
ciled the Meads decision with Yeaiy and Burton. The court acknowledged that immunity ex-
isted for the performance of a discretionary act. On the basis of Meads, however, the court
concluded that "not every type of conduct... is protected." Id at 53, 302 A.2d at 495. This
ance of a claim by the state banking secretary4' and the selection of a
children's camp by an antipoverty commission leader4' were within
the discretion of the officials and thus, absent proof of malice, the
officials enjoyed immunity from suit. Similarly, a veterinarian em-
ployed by the Philadelphia Department of Health received immu-
nity for his erroneous determination that certain meat was unfit for
human consumption.42 That liability should not lie for a mistake in
the performance of a discretionary act, particularly when a less zeal-
ous attempt to perform that duty could endanger the health of con-
sumers, was the basis of the court's reasoning.43
An official's status, therefore, did not determine the existence of
immunity.' Rather, attention was focused on the nature of the
function that was being performed. Immunity was confined to those
areas in which the imposition of liability would impede the fearless
performance of official duties.
45
B. Absolute Privilege - Defamation Suits
Because of policy considerations not present in other common-
law torts, 46 immunity is applied differently in defamation actions.
All government communications are made on an occasion of privi-
lege.47 Privilege48 reflects the public's interest in the affairs of gov-
ernment as well as the individual's interest in his reputation. The
endorsement of Meads implies that one's status is not determinative of the issue of immunity.
Neither an official nor an employee would be granted immunity for the performance of a
nondiscretionary act. But see notes 79-81 and accompanying text infra.
40. Schwinn v. Gordon, 134 Pa. Super. Ct. 422, 3 A.2d 926 (1939).
41. Waters v. Evans, 47 Pa. D. & C.2d 419 (C.P. Phila. 1969), aft'dper curiam, 218 Pa.
Super. Ct. 141, 279 A.2d 286 (1971).
42. Salus & Son, Inc. v. Kohn, 38 Pa. D. & C. 401 (C.P. Phila. 1940).
43. "[Tlhe public interest requires that where a doubt exists as to the fitness of food for
human consumption it should be condemned, rather than hazard the consumer to the serious
risk entailed in eating polluted food." Id at 404.
44. See note 39 supra. The secretary of banking and the township supervisors would,
presumably, be high level officials and thus, absolutely immune under the pre-Act 152 stan-
dard. See notes 69-71 and 76-77 and accompanying text infra.
45. See note 8 and accompanying text supra. Judicial review necessarily entails a post
factum determination of reasonableness. Discretionary acts, however, are not susceptible to
measurement by an inflexible rule. Thus, an official would be unable to adjust his conduct to
any particular standard. The threat of liability when a standard of care is undefined would
have an inhibitory effect on public officials. See notes 162-65 and accompanying text infra.
46. See Federal Executive Immunity, supra note 6, at 640-41. The constitutional guaran-
tee of free speech, U.S. CONST. amend. I, is a factor considered in determining the existence of
a privileged publication. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). See
also Veeder, Absolute Immunity in Defamation: Judicial Proceedings, 9 COLUM. L. REv. 463,
469 (1909).
47. Montgomery v. City of Philadelphia, 392 Pa. 178, 181, 140 A.2d 100, 102 (1958). See
generally W. PROSSER, supra note 8, at 785-86.
48. When the public's interest in a particular writing or speech is deemed superior to the
individual interest concerned, language otherwise actionable in defamation is said to be ex-
cused or made on an occasion of privilege. Veeder, supra note 46, at 468-69.
Privilege is of two types: absolute and conditional. W. PROSSER, supra note 8, at 776-77.
Absolute privilege was initially confined to the legislative and judicial branches of government
but has subsequently been extended to include other high-ranking government officials. Con-
privilege is conditional, however, and may be lost if the communica-
tion is "made for an improper motive, in an improper manner, or [is]
not based upon reasonable or probable cause."49
Some authorities, however, have expressed concern that condi-
tional privilege is inadequate to ensure complete and open disclo-
sure." An official would be obliged to take time from his duties to
defend his motive. Moreover, the official faces the substantial risk
that the trier of fact will find his statements unreasonable.5' The
threat of liability, therefore, may deter public officials from speaking
with candor about public affairs. Thus, absolute privilege for certain
public officials is believed to be the only viable solution.52
Absolute privilege was first articulated in Pennsylvania in Mat-
son v. Margiott. 33 The Attorney General was sued for libel because
of the contents of a letter that he had written to a county district
attorney. The letter demanded the dismissal of an assistant district
attorney because of her affiliation with certain communist organiza-
tions. The plaintiff alleged that the contents of the letter were false,
that the statements were maliciously made, and that the libelous let-
ter was released to the press.54 The Matson court made an initial
examination of the Attorney General's responsibilities and con-
cluded that it was his duty to inform the district attorney of his find-
ings.55 Consequently, the disclosure was absolutely privileged, and
the Attorney General was absolutely immune from liability for its
contents.56 The court experienced greater difficulty in ruling on the
press release, but found that the plaintiffs reputation interest was
outweighed by the public's right to be informed of the conduct and
ditional privilege, "conditioned upon publication in a reasonable manner and for a proper
purpose," may be invoked by a private citizen as well as a government official. Id at 786.
49. Montgomery v. City of Philadelphia, 392 Pa. 178, 182, 140 A.2d 100, 102-03 (1958).
See, e.g., Dempsky v. Double, 386 Pa. 542, 126 A.2d 915 (1956); Montgomery v. Dennison,
363 Pa. 255, 69 A.2d 520 (1949).
50. See Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 575-76 (1959); Montgomery v. City of Philadel-
phia, 392 Pa. 178, 183, 140 A.2d 100, 103 (1958). See also Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483
(1896); Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1949), cer. denied, 339 U.S. 949 (1950).
51. See Montgomery v. City of Philadelphia, 392 Pa. 178, 182, 140 A.2d 100, 102-03
(1958). W. PROSSER, supra note 8, at 784.
52. Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 576 (1959). But see Gray, supra note 8, at 310; Handler
& Klein, supra note 29, at 62. That the public's interest in the effective functioning of govern-
ment requires an absolute bar to suit is doubtful. See Vaughn, The PersonalAccountability of
Public Employees, 25 AM. U. L. REV. 85, 86 (1975). No evidence has been adduced to support
the proposition that public employees will be less willing to perform their duties if they are
held to a good faith standard of behavior. Id at 94. See, e.g., Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564,
590 (1959) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
53. 371 Pa. 188, 88 A.2d 892 (1952).
54. Id at 192, 88 A.2d at 894.
55. Id at 198, 88 A.2d at 897.
56. "[Tlhis official letter, being written by a public official in the course and within the
scope of his powers, was 'absolutely privileged;' and. . . even if the allegations were erroneous
and false, and were maliciously made, this privilege was absolute and constituted a complete
defense." Id at 202, 88 A.2d at 899.
activities of government. 7
The Matson court was cognizant of the danger of overextending
the principle of absolute privilege,58 but declined to enunciate ex-
plicit guidelines for determining entitlement to the privilege. In
Montgomery v. City of Philadelphia, 59 however, the court articulated
a three-pronged test to determine whether a particular official is enti-
tled to the privilege.6" The Montgomery court was primarily con-
cerned with the impact that the threat of liability would have on an
official's ability to execute his duties.6 The test posited by the court
thus included an analysis of the official's duties, the importance of
his office, and the extent to which the official formulated government
policy.62 Presumably, privilege would be denied under the Mont-
gomery analysis unless the threat of liability would impede the offi-
cial's ability to execute his duties.63
C Status Based Immunity
L Immunityfor High Level Officials. -The development of the
high-low status level distinction 6' was facilitated by the supreme
court's decision in Jonnet v. Bodick.65 The plaintiff sued a second
class township and several township supervisors to recover expenses
incurred in preparing to construct a motel. A building permit had
been denied because the proposed project failed to comply with a
township zoning ordinance. The plaintiff alleged, however, that the
supervisors had informed him of the necessary requirements, that he
agreed to comply, and that he acted in reliance on their assurance
that a building permit would be granted.66 The plaintiff was denied
57. Id at 204-05, 88 A.2d at 900. A distinction should be made, however, between re-
ports of official action and reports that purport to be statements of fact within the personal
knowledge of the author. See, e.g., Lipman v. Brisbane Elementary School Dist., 55 Cal. 2d
224, 359 P.2d 465, 11 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1961). The public interest may require a tolerance for
error in reports of official conduct. Statements of fact within the personal knowledge of the
author, however, may demand closer scrutiny for good faith. Id at 234, 359 P.2d at 470, II
Cal. Rptr. at 102.
58. See Matson v. Margiotti, 371 Pa. 188, 198, 88 A.2d 892, 897 (1952).
59. 392 Pa. 178, 140 A.2d 100 (1958). See note 63 infra
60. The court concluded that the decision to grant immunity "should depend upon the
nature of [the official's] duties, the importance of his office, and particularly whether or not he
has policy making functions." Id at 186, 140 A.2d at 105.
61. Id at 187, 140 A.2d at 105.
62. Id at 186, 140 A.2d at 105.
63. The court granted absolute privilege to a Deputy Commissioner of Public Property
and a city architect because their duties required them to issue press releases concerning the
progress in construction of city buildings. The court concluded that denying the privilege in
this instance would "impair the proper performance of [that] function." Id at 187, 140 A.2d at
105.
64. See notes 12-14 and accompanying text supra.
65. 431 Pa. 59, 244 A.2d 751 (1968).
66. Id at 60, 244 A.2d at 752. The plaintiff sought approval of his project although
aware of the existence of a zoning ordinance prohibiting his intended use. Since the supervi-
sors had no authority to grant or deny a building permit, the action was apparently based on
the theory that the supervisors furnished misleading information. Id at 60, 244 A.2d at 753.
recovery against the township because he failed to exhaust other
available remedies.67 In the action against the township supervisors,
the court held that absolute privilege is not restricted to defamation68
and that the supervisors qualified under the three-pronged test69 ar-
ticulated in Montgomery v. City of Philadelphia, 70 and, therefore,
were absolutely immune from liability.7
Because of the policies considered in Montgomery and Matson v.
Margiottl, 72 the Jonnet court proceeded on the assumption that "the
public interest requires immunity."73 Even accepting this premise,
however, the facts of the Jonnet case do not support a strong argu-
ment in favor of absolute immunity. The complaint did not allege
malicious, wanton, or reckless conduct, and the defendants were ar-
guably performing a discretionary function.7 4 Thus, the limited im-
munity available to public officials would have been a complete
defense.75 Although the supervisors qualified as high level offi-
cials,76 the court declined to evaluate what, if any, effect granting less
than absolute immunity would have on the officials' ability to per-
form their duties.7 7 The court thus eliminated the flexibility permit-
ted by the Montgomery standard and adopted a wholly status-based
formula.
2. Immunityfor Low Level Officials. -Consistent with the sta-
tus-based approach formulated for high government officials,7 8 sev-
67. The plaintiff should have appealed the denial of the permit to the township zoning
adjustment board. Id
68. Id at 62, 244 A.2d at 753.
69. See notes 59-60 and accompanying text supra.
70. 392 Pa. 178, 140 A.2d 100 (1958). The Jonnet court concluded: "There are no more
important officers in second class townships than the Supervisors. They exercise the entire
legislative and executive powers of the municipality and there can be no doubt of the fact that
they do indeed exercise policy making functions." 431 Pa. at 62, 244 A.2d at 753.
71. Id
72. 371 Pa. 188, 88 A.2d 892 (1952). See notes 58-63 and accompanying text supra.
73. 431 Pa. at 62, 244 A.2d at 753.
74. See note 8 and accompanying text supra. Although the defendants had no authority
to grant or deny a permit, they presumably had the responsibility to interpret township ordi-
nances and to inform the public of the steps necessary to comply with those ordinances. If
their actions were beyond the scope of their authority, they would not be entitled to immunity.
Matson v. Margiotti, 371 Pa. 188, 88 A.2d 892 (1952); Ammlung v. Platt, 224 Pa. Super. Ct. 47,
302 A.2d 491 (1973).
75. See notes 34-38 and accompanying text supra.
76. See note 70 supra.
77. See note 63 and accompanying text supra. The doctrine of official immunity presup-
poses that immunity should be granted for particular activities because they are "susceptible to
impairment as a result of the fear of liability." Federal Executive Immunity, supra note 6, at
640 n.95. Thus, prior to the Jonnet extension of absolute privilege, township supervisors were
protected from liability for mistakes in the performance of a discretionary act. See Yealy v.
Fink, 43 Pa. 212 (1862). If this is an insufficient means of ensuring the effective functioning of
government, absolute immunity may be necessary. But see note 52 supra. This decision should
be made, however, only after a consideration of the areas sufficiently sensitive to justify an
absolute bar to suit. See generally Becht, The Absolute Privilege of the Executive in Defamation,
15 VAND. L. REV. 1127, 1166 (1962).
78. See note 77 and accompanying text supra.
eral lower courts have developed a similar approach for low level
officials. Reasoning that the purpose of immunity is equally applica-
ble to the performance of nondiscretionary acts,7 9 these courts have
extended the immunity formerly restricted to the performance of a
discretionary act.8" Under this approach, the nature of the conduct
is irrelevant. Low level officials are thus entitled to immunity for all
conduct, provided they act within the scope of their authority and
their actions are not malicious, wanton, or reckless.8 '
"[P]revent[ing] overcaution. . . on the part of public employees
charged with the exercise of their judgment""2 can, however, be ac-
complished without extending a blanket immunity to anyone on the
Commonwealth's payroll. Nondiscretionary acts are traditionally
treated under a tort analysis, and the standard of care is well de-
fined.83 Consequently, an official performing a routine task would
be capable of adjusting his conduct to comply with this standard of
care.84 Discretionary acts, however, are not susceptible to a judicial
determination of reasonableness. Thus, an official performing a dis-
cretionary act should be granted sufficient immunity to ensure the
unfettered exercise of his judgment.85
3. Application of the High-Low Status Level Distinction. -Be-
79. See Walter v. Commonwealth, 23 Pa. Commw. Ct. 97, 99-100, 350 A.2d 440, 442
(1976). See generaly, Lehnig v. Felton, 235 Pa. Super. Ct. 100, 340 A.2d 564 (1975), vacated,
481 Pa. 557, 393 A.2d 302 (1978).
80. See notes 8-9 and accompanying text supra. In Ammlung v. Platt, 224 Pa. Super. Ct.
47, 302 A.2d 491 (1973), the court in dicta restricted immunity to the performance of a discre-
tionary act. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit adopted the Ammlung court's reason-
ing in United States ex rel. Fear v. Rundle, 506 F.2d 331 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S.
1012 (1975). The Fear court concluded that Pennsylvania law would permit the imposition of
liability for the negligent performance of a nondiscretionary act. Id at 335.
Subsequently, however, the superior court did not discuss the "discretion" requirement.
See Lehnig v. Felton, 235 Pa. Super. Ct. 100, 340 A.2d 564 (1975), vacated, 481 Pa. 557, 393
A.2d 302 (1978). On the basis of the Lehnig court's failure to discuss the restriction of immu-
nity to discretionary acts the federal district court in Teague v. Consolidated Bathhurst, Ltd.,
408 F. Supp. 980 (E.D. Pa. 1976), felt "constrained" to ignore the restriction. Id at 982.
The matter was settled in Walter v. Commonwealth, 23 Pa. Commw. Ct. 97, 350 A.2d 440
(1976). The commonwealth court advised that the policy of promoting the fearless exercise of
official duties is apposite to nondiscretionary duties. Id at 99-100, 350 at 442.
81. Brungard v. Hartman, 12 Pa. Commw. Ct. 477, 315 A.2d 913 (1974), rev'd, 483 Pa.
200, 394 A.2d 1265 (1978).
82. Ammlung v. Platt, 224 Pa. Super. Ct. 47, 57, 302 A.2d 491, 497 (1973).
83. Moreover, the performance of a nondiscretionary duty is typically required. Thus,
the question does not entail a decision to perform or not to perform the act. Consequently, the
threat of liability would have virtually no effect on the performance of that duty. See note 45
and accompanying text supra and notes 167-69 and accompanying text infra
84. The purpose of immunity is not to remove the possibility of suit simply because one
is employed by the government. Rather, immunity is intended to promote the effective func-
tioning of government by protecting the official's performance of activities that would be ad-
versely affected by the threat of liability. See note 77 supra.
85. The immunity should, however, be subject to the "malicious, wanton, or reckless"
standard. The lower courts have termed this immunity "qualified" or "conditional" because of
the distinction invoked in Montgomery v. City of Philadelphia, 392 Pa. 178, 140 A.2d 100
(1958), between "absolute" and "conditional" privilege.
cause of the development of absolute immunity86 and the extension
of immunity to nondiscretionary acts, lower courts have been able to
posit an immunity in any suit against an official or employee of the
Commonwealth.87
In Dubree v. Commonwealth,88 for example, the commonwealth
court affirmed the dismissal of a complaint alleging negligence89 on
the part of the Commonwealth and seven named individuals9" em-
ployed by the Department of Highways.9 Acknowledging that "lia-
bility may be different for each individual defendant, based upon the
job he holds and its responsibilities,"92 the court nonetheless de-
clined to undertake an analysis of the officials concerned. Instead,
the court reiterated the traditional argument in favor of absolute im-
munity93 and proposed a novel justification for conditional immu-
nity,94 stating that conditional immunity was necessary to protect the
immunity of the sovereign Commonwealth.95 Moreover, without at-
tempting to harmonize these disparate policies96 the court deter-
86. See notes 68-71 and accompanying text supra.
87. Absolute immunity is retained regardless of the presence of malice, and the immunity
of low level officials can be destroyed only by proof of malice. Therefore, since many com-
plaints allege only simple or gross negligence, a hearing on the merits is foreclosed. Moreover,
the courts are relieved of the task of determining entitlement to absolute immunity because
they are able to presume the existence of conditional immunity. See Lehnig v. Felton, 235 Pa.
Super. Ct. 100, 340 A.2d 564 (1975), vacated, 481 Pa. 557, 393 A.2d 302 (1978); Kenno v.
Commonwealth, 31 Pa. Commw. Ct. 207, 375 A.2d 1358 (1977).
88. 8 Pa. Commw. Ct. 567, 303 A.2d 530 (1973), vacated, 481 Pa. 540, 393 A.2d 293
(1978). Dubree was a wrongful death action. The decedent was killed when the automobile
that he was driving plunged into a ravine caused by the removal of a bridge two days earlier.
89. Plaintiff alleged that the individual defendants were negligent in causing and permit-
ting the excavation to exist in a major highway and in failing to erect adequate signs, barri-
cades, and lights to warn motorists. Record at 5a, Dubree v. Commonwealth, 481 Pa. 540, 393
A.2d 293 (1978).
90. The positions held by the defendants were as follows: Secretary of Highways; Dist.
Engineer; Asst. Dist. Engineer, Superintendent of Maintenance; Asst. Superintendent of Main-
tenance; and two foremen. 8 Pa. Commw. Ct. 567, 569, 303 A.2d 530, 531 (1973). The com-
monwealth court apparently presumed that the foremen were officials for purposes of
immunity, because no distinction was made when conditional immunity was discussed. Id at
571, 303 A.2d at 532.
91. The Department of Highways has since been replaced by the Department of Trans-
portation.
92. 8 Pa. Commw. Ct. at 570, 303 A.2d at 532.
93. "[Slociety has an interest in protecting the unfettered discharge of the public business
and. . . absolute immunity [is] a means of removing any inhibition which might deprive the
public of the best services of its officers." Id at 574, 303 A.2d at 534.
94. See note 85 supra. The court reasoned that sovereign immunity "would be unavailing
if there were not also some form of immunity granted to those officers and employees whom
the Commonwealth must necessarily employ." 8 Pa. Commw. Ct. at 574: 303 A.2d at 534.
95. Id
96. The doctrines of sovereign and official immunity spring from distinct concerns. Ber-
mann, Integrating Governmental and Officer Tort Liability, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 1175, 1181
(1977). Official immunity is designed to prevent the fear of personal liability from interfering
with the performance of official duties. See generally Federal Executive Immunity, supra note
6, at 632-34. Sovereign immunity, however, involves the constitutional question of the Com-
monwealth consenting to be sued. The immunity is frequently justified as necessary to prevent
the depletion of the treasury. See generally Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 YALE
L.J. 1, 129 (1924).
mined that the public interest would be promoted "in much the same
manner" if a conditional immunity were extended to "those public
officers and employees not entitled to absolute immunity."97 Conse-
quently, the court was satisfied that the defendants would qualify as
either high or low level officials and would therefore, be immune
98
under any formulation.99
Because of the practice of presuming immunity, few guidelines
exist for determining entitlement to immunity. Thus, the tort claims
act"°° must be examined to determine what, if any, effect it will have
on the law of immunity as it has developed in the lower courts.
IV. Act 152
A. Legislative Intent
The General Assembly responded to the supreme court's abro-
gation of the doctrine of sovereign immunity'l° initially by empha-
sizing its constitutional power to determine the extent of
Commonwealth liability. 0 2 Article 1, section 11 of the Pennsylvania
Constitution0 3 provides that "[s]uits may be brought against the
Commonwealth in such manner, in such courts and in such cases as
the Legislature may by law direct.' By acting pursuant to this
section, the legislature thus reaffirmed prior case law holding that the
97. 8 Pa. Commw. Ct. at 574, 303 A.2d at 534. The court thus fully embraced the status
based approach. Consequently, the court considered neither the need for immunity nor the
nature of the conduct concerned.
98. Judge Crumlish dissented because he believed that the determination to grant condi-
tional immunity could be made only after a hearing on the merits. Id at 576, 303 A.2d at 535.
See, e.g., Montgomery v. City of Philadelphia, 392 Pa. 178, 182-83, 140 A.2d 100. 103 (1958).
See Ammlung v. Platt, 224 Pa. Super. Ct. 47, 302 A.2d 491 (1973). The dissent's approach
would require an initial determination of entitlement to absolute immunity, thus precluding
the presumption of immunity in any suit against an official.
99. The formulation adopted by the commonwealth court in Dubree presents a formida-
ble obstacle to recovery by a victim injured by a conditionally immune official. The following
elements must be present before the official will be subject to liability: the official was not
acting within the scope of his authority; the conduct complained of was intentional; and the
conduct was malicious, wanton, or reckless. 8 Pa. Commw. Ct. at 574-75, 303 A.2d at 534.
This formulation is far more protective than the immunity developed at early common
law. See notes 32-45 and accompanying text supra. Under this formulation, the official is not
liable, even for conduct beyond the scope of his authority, unless the conduct was "intentional,
as well as malicious, wanton or reckless." 8 Pa. Commw. Ct. at 574-75, 303 A.2d at 534.
It is unlikely that the public interest in the effective functioning of government requires
immunity for an official acting beyond the scope of his authority. Thus, a reconsideration of
immunity by the supreme court was clearly warranted. See notes 171-74 and accompanying
text infra.
100. See note 4 and accompanying text supra.
101. See notes 1-2 and accompanying text supra.
102. "Pursuant to section 11 of Article I of the Constitution of Pennsylvania, it is hereby
declared to be the intent of the General Assembly that the Commonwealth ... shall continue
to enjoy sovereign ... immunity ... except as the General Assembly shall specifically waive
the immunity." 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2310 (Purdon Supp. 1979).
103. PA. CONST. art. i, § 11.
104. Id
section was not self-executing. °5 The legislature's reinstitution of
sovereign immunity thus stands on a firm foundation.
Although Act 152 was primarily intended to address the ques-
tion of sovereign immunity, the legislature dealt simultaneously with
the subject of official immunity. The expressed intent of the legisla-
ture was that "the Commonwealth and its officials and employees
.. .shall continue to enjoy sovereign and official immunity. . . ex-
cept as the General Assembly shall specifically waive the immu-
nity."'" A literal interpretation would suggest that officials and
employees are subject to suit only in those instances in which sover-
eign immunity has been waived.' 7 Since the legislature intended to
control the manner in which the Commonwealth could be sued, 08
however, it would seem appropriate to limit the circumstances in
which an individual or instrumentality could assert the liability of
the Commonwealth.0 9 Perceived in this context, the Act draws a
distinction between the official and personal liability of the official or
employee. I 0
105. Prior to the decision in Mayle v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Highways, 479 Pa. 384, 388
A.2d 709 (1978), the court consistently held that only the legislature could authorize suits
against the Commonwealth and, therefore, that only the legislature could modify the constitu-
tionally based doctrine of sovereign immunity. See, e.g., Brown v. Commonwealth, 453 Pa.
566, 305 A.2d 868 (1973). See Specter v. Commonwealth, 462 Pa. 474, 341 A.2d 481 (1975);
Laughner v. Allegheny County, 436 Pa. 572, 261 A.2d 607 (1970); Stouffer v. Morrison, 400 Pa.
497, 162 A.2d 378 (1960). But see Sloan, Lessons in Constitutional Interpretation: Sovereign
Immunity in Pennsylvania, 82 DICK. L. REV. 209, 259-61 (1978).
106. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2310 (Purdon Supp. 1979-80) (emphasis added). A simi-
lar provision appears in the "Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act." 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 5311.301 (Purdon Supp. 1979-80).
107. This interpretation would, however, have absurd consequences. A "low level" offi-
cial, for example, could be sued at common law if the official's conduct was malicious, wanton,
or reckless. Ammlung v. Platt, 224 Pa. Super. Ct. 47, 302 A.2d 491 (1973). Sovereign immu-
nity has not, however, been waived for intentional torts committed by officials or employees of
the Commonwealth. See notes 115 and 118 and accompanying text infra. Thus, if an official
could be sued only when the Commonwealth could be similarly subject to liability, all officials
and employees would, in many instances, be absolutely immune. See Bermann, supra note 96,
at 1181 nn.41 & 42 (compilation of state tort claims acts and their interpretation of this prob-
lem).
108. See note 104 and accompanying text supra.
109. The Commonwealth can only commit a tort through the officials and employees it
necessarily employs. Consequently, certain restrictions have been placed on the circumstances
in which the Commonwealth may be sued on a theory of respondeat superior. See notes 111-17
and accompanying text infra.
110. In his official capacity, an official or employee may engage the liability of the Com-
monwealth. See note 109 supra. In his personal capacity, however, subject to certain common-
law defenses and immunities incorporated by the act, see notes 121-31 and accompanying text
infra, the official or employee is subject to liability for his own misdeeds.
Pennsylvania courts have not, however, directly addressed the distinction between the
two capacities. Indeed, suits against officials are occasionally treated as suits against the Com-
monwealth. See Sloan, supra note 105, at 211-12.
One jurisdiction has distinguished between the official's personal liability and the liability
of his office. See Tocco v. Piersante, 69 Mich. App. 616, 245 N.W.2d 356 (1976). If the plain-
tiff is injured because the official violated a duty owed to the plaintiff personally, the official is
liable in his personal capacity. Id at 624-25, 245 N.W.2d at 360 (duty to refrain from defam-
ing the plaintiff). If, on the other hand, the duty violated is owed to the public generally, the
liability of the office, and thus of the state, is invoked. Id
B. Liability of the Commonwealth
The specific areas in which the Commonwealth has waived sov-
ereign immunity are contained in section 5110"' of the Act." 2 A
cause of action must, however, satisfy each of the four following con-
ditions before suit may be brought in one of those areas: first, the
action must be against "Commonwealth agencies, and their officials
and employees;" '"1 3 second, the officials and employees must have
been acting within the scope of their duties;" 4 third, the damages
must arise "out of a negligent act or omission;"' Iand last, the dam-
ages must be of a kind that "would be recoverable under the com-
mon law or a statute creating a cause of action if caused by a person
not having the defense of sovereign immunity." ' 6 Thus, an official or
employee is unable to create liability against the Commonwealth
111. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5110(a)(I)-(8) (Purdon Supp. 1979-80).
112. The defense of sovereign immunity will not bar an action for damages when the
damages result from the operation of a motor vehicle, are caused by Commonwealth health
care personnel, or result from the care or control of personal property by the Commonwealth.
Sovereign immunity is retained, however, for damages arising from the use of nuclear and
other radioactive equipment, devices, and materials. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 511 0(a)(l)-
(3) (Purdon Supp. 1079-80).
Although sovereign immunity has been waived for damages caused by the dangerous
condition of Commonwealth owned real property (including sidewalks and highways), certain
limitations should be noted. Property damage caused by the dangerous condition of highways
is not recoverable. In addition, the damages must be caused by a dangerous condition that was
created by "natural elements." Moreover, to recover, the plaintiff must establish that the dan-
gerous condition created a "reasonably foreseeable risk" and that the Commonwealth had
written notice of the dangerous condition. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 511 0(a)(4)-(5) (Purdon
Supp. 1979-80).
Additional areas in which sovereign immunity cannot be raised as a defense include the
following: damages caused by animals, excluding wild animals, in the care and custody of the
Commonwealth; damages caused by a member of the National Guard; and damages caused
by certain sales of liquor in Commonwealth owned liquor stores. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 51 10(a)(6)-(8) (Purdon Supp. 1979-80).
113. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5110(a) (Purdon Supp. 1979-80). The term "Common-
wealth agency" is not defined in the Act. The Act does, however, amend Title 42, Judiciary
and Judicial Procedure, of the Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes, 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
which contains a provision defining certain words and phrases that appear throughout the title.
"Commonwealth agency" is therein defined to include "any executive or independent agency."
42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 102 (Purdon 1978).
The term "executive agency" includes the Governor and the departments, boards, com-
missions, authorities, and officials of the executive branch of government. Id The definition
of an "independent agency" includes those "boards, commissions, authorities and other agen-
cies and officers" that do not fall within the definition of "executive agency." Id Excluded
from the definitions of "executive" and "independent" agencies are officials or agencies of the
legislative and judicial branches of government. Id
The "fiscal autonomy" test used by the supreme court to determine whether an "agency"
is amenable to suit, see Specter v. Commonwealth, 462 Pa. 474, 341 A.2d 481 (1975), is no
longer viable because of the definition of "Commonwealth agency." See generally Note, Sov-
ereign Immunity Update: Specter v. Commonwealth, 80 DICK. L. REV. 616 (1976).
114. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5110(a) (Purdon Supp. 1979-80).
115. Id Malicious, wanton, or reckless conduct would obviously be excluded.
116. Id (emphasis added). The defense of sovereign immunity has not been successfully
raised by an official sued in his personal capacity. E.g., Meads v. Rutter, 122 Pa. Super. Ct. 64,
184 A. 560 (1936); Moore v. Eastern State School & Hosp., 5 Pa. D. & C.3d 121 (C.P. Bucks
1978).
when he is acting beyond the scope of his duties" 7 or if he commits
an intentional tort.
18
C Officers and Employees.- Defenses Retained
Article 1, section 11 of the Pennsylvania Constitution" 9 ad-
dresses only the manner in which the Commonwealth may be sued.
The common-law doctrine of official immunity, on the other hand,
determines the circumstances in which suits may be brought against
officials and employees of the Commonwealth. The courts have not
interpreted this doctrine to require legislative authorization before
an official or employee can be sued in his personal capacity. Thus,
by adopting the common-law doctrine of official immunity without
qualification, the legislature has sanctioned this interpretation.
20
Section 5110(b) of Act 152121 specifically retains three common-
law defenses: first, "defenses which have heretofore been available
to" legislators, t22 members of the judiciary,'23 and officials; 24 sec-
ond, "the defense that the act or omission was within the discretion
granted to the official or employee;"'125 and last, "the defense that the
employee was acting pursuant to a duty required by a statute or...
regulation."' 26 Three distinct standards of immunity have thus been
created. The Act limits entitlement to absolute or conditional immu-
117. See note 114 and accompanying text supra.
118. See note 115 and accompanying text supra. See, e.g., JOINT STATE GOV'T COMM'N,
GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF COMMW. OF PA., SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 1, 11 (1978) [hereinafter
cited as SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY]. The official or employee is still personally liable for an inten-
tional tort. See note 107 supra.
119. All courts shall be open; and every man for an injury done him in his lands,
goods, person or reputation shall have remedy by due course of law, and right and
justice administered without sale, denial or delay. Suits may be brought against the
Commonwealth in such manner, in such courts and in such cases as the legislature
may by law direct.
PA. CONST. art. I, § 1I.
120. See Commonwealth v. Wanamaker, 450 Pa. 77, 296 A.2d 618 (1972). The validity of
this proposition was recently affirmed by the commonwealth court in Estate of Armstrong v.
Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation & Parole, - Pa. Commw. Ct. -, 405 A.2d 1099 (1979). The
Armstrong court held that the governing principles of official immunity are those enunciated
by the supreme court in Dubree v. Commonwealth, 481 Pa. 540, 393 A.2d 293 (1978), despite
the previous enactment of Act 152. See note 17 and accompanying text supra. The court con-
cluded that
Act 152 did not make the traditional court-made common law principles of official
immunity the statutory law of the Commonwealth. . . and. . . did not, therefore,
remove the power of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to supplant or modify them, as
the Court did in Dubree. The principles of official immunity are not stated in Act 152.
All that appears are expressions by the Legislature that it intends that its officials and
employees should continue to enjoy official immunity. . . . [This] plainly impl[ies]
that the old defenses simply continue in all their aspects as judicially created common
law principles.
_ Pa. Commw. Ct. at -, 405 A.2d at 1102 (emphasis added).
121. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5110(b) (Purdon Supp. 1979-80).
122. Id § 5110(b)(1). See note 25 supra.
123. Id See note 25 supra.
124. See note 15 supra and notes 127-28 and accompanying text infra.
125. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 51 10(b)(3) (Purdon Supp. 1979-80).
126. Id § 5110(b)(2).
nity 127 to officials, 28 but immunizes the negligent performance of
discretionary duties 29 by either an official or an employee.' 30  An
employee, on the other hand, can raise the defense that he acted pur-
suant to a statutory duty even though his actions do not fall within
the defined defenses.'
3'
D. Problems of Definition
1. Official Immunity -- "An official of the Commonwealth
agency or a member of the General Assembly or the judiciary may
assert on his own behalf or the Commonwealth may assert on his
behalf, defenses which have heretofore been available to such offi-
cials."' 32 Although judges and legislators are clearly defined, the
provision leaves unresolved the problem of identifying the officials
entitled to the defense.
The rule of absolute privilege for defamation was formulated
without reference to the limited immunity available to public offi-
cials for other common-law torts. 3 3 The extension of the privilege
to common-law torts generally was similarly accomplished without
reference to the immunity existing at common law. 134  Thus, no
guidelines were imposed to clearly distinguish an official 35 for the
127. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5110(b)(1) (Purdon Supp. 1979-80). See note 15 supra
and note 132 and accompanying text infra.
128. This interpretation presumes that by using the terms "official" and "employee" si-
multaneously, the legislature intended to draw a distinction. The Act, however, fails to define
the terms. See notes 146-50 and accompanying text infra.
Although Act 152 codifies the common law, the courts have not made the same distinc-
tion. See note 39 supra. Initially, this was of little consequence because immunity was re-
stricted to the performance of a discretionary act. But see note 80 and accompanying text
supra. Thus, even an employee, typically responsible only for carrying out the orders of superi-
ors, would be immune if he had occasion to perform a discretionary task. See Ammlung v.
Platt, 224 Pa. Super. Ct. 47, 302 A.2d 491 (1973). See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 8, at
988-90.
Notwithstanding the extension of immunity to nondiscretionary acts, see note 80 and ac-
companying text supra, the restriction of official immunity to officials will require at least a
rudimentary appraisal of the individual's duties. Thus, the presumption of immunity currently
practiced by the lower courts is inapplicable under the Act. See notes 87 and 100 and accom-
panying text supra.
129. See note 8 supra.
130. 42 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 51 10(b)(3) (Purdon Supp. 1979-80). See notes 150-52
and accompanying text infra.
131. Id § 51 10(b)(2). See notes 154-55 and accompanying text infra.
132. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 51 10(b)(l) (Purdon Supp. 1979-80).
133. See Montgomery v. City of Philadelphia, 392 Pa. 178, 140 A.2d 100(1958); Matson v.
Margiotti, 371 Pa. 188, 88 A.2d 892 (1952).
134. See Jonnet v. Bodick, 431 Pa. 59, 244 A.2d 751 (1968).
135. The courts have applied one definition of the term "officer" to determine whether the
commonwealth court has jurisdiction of a suit under § 401 of the Appellate Court Jurisdiction
Act of 1970, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 211.401 (Supp. 1978). "[O]fficers, for jurisdictional pur-
poses ... encompass only those persons who perform state-wide policy making functions and
who are charged with the responsibility for independent initiation of administrative policy
regarding some sovereign function of state government." Opie v. Glascow, Inc., 30 Pa.
Commw. Ct. 555, 559, 375 A.2d 396, 398 (1977). This definition has not, however, been uti-
lized as a standard for determining entitlement to immunity. See Schroeck v. Pennsylvania
purpose of determining entitlement to either degree of immunity.
(a) "'High level officials. "--On three occasions the supreme
court was required to determine whether an individual was a high
level official. Thus, the Attorney General, 36 a deputy city commis-
sioner and city architect, 37 and the supervisors of a second class
township 138 were deemed high level officials. Pivotal to the court's
determination, however, was the nature of the official's duties 39 and
the functional necessity 4 ° of immunity in the particular case.
14
Under this formulation, therefore, the term "absolute immunity"
may be overstated. 142  An official is faced with the threat that the
court's initial examination will reveal that he does not qualify as a
high level official. The official cannot, therefore, completely rely on
absolute immunity from suit. Thus, the purpose of the immunity
fails. 141
The lower courts have not utilized the screening approach ap-
plied by the supreme court. Absolute immunity is granted liberally
without an evaluation of the official's duties, his office, or whether he
has policy making functions.44 Although this approach removes the
threat of suit, it does so without identifying the officials entitled to
absolute immunity. The courts simply assume that the official is
high level or, in the alternative, that there is "at least a conditional
State Police, 26 Pa. Commw. Ct. 41, 362 A.2d 486 (1976); Fisher v. Kassab, 25 Pa. Commw. Ct.
593, 360 A.2d 809 (1976).
136. Matson v. Margiotti, 371 Pa. 188, 88 A.2d 892 (1952).
137. Montgomery v. City of Philadelphia, 392 Pa. 178, 140 A.2d 100 (1958).
138. Jonnet v. Bodick, 431 Pa. 59, 244 A.2d 751 (1968).
139. See note 60 and accompanying text supra.
140. See note 12 and accompanying text supra.
141. See Montgomery v. City of Philadelphia, 392 Pa. 178, 140 A.2d 100 (1958); Matson v.
Margiotti, 371 Pa. 188, 88 A.2d 892 (1952). But see Jonnet v. Bodick, 431 Pa. 59, 244 A.2d 751
(1968).
142. For criticism of an approach that determines absolute immunity on a case-by-case
basis, see Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 527-28 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Mr.
Justice Rehnquist believes that an official must be aware, before he acts, that he will be abso-
lutely immune from suit. Thus, he concludes that a case-by-case analysis is inconsistent with
absolute immunity. Id
143. It may be deemed a failure, however, only if one accepts the recent proposal that an
official must be absolutely free from the threat of suit to effectively perform his duties. The
original justification for absolute immunity was the impossibility of separating the frivolous
claims of malice from the meritorious ones. See Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579 (2d Cir.
1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949 (1950). See also Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 (1896). See
notes 181-82 and accompanying text infra.
A case-by-case analysis is not inconsistent with the purpose of the immunity. Courts are
frequently obliged to determine the substantive merit of a claim for relief. Moreover, if the
analysis reveals that the nature of the official's conduct makes him particularly susceptible to
unwarranted charges of malice, the courts could grant immunity sufficient to foreclose inquiry
into his motive. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 507 (1978). See notes 183-85 and ac-
companying text infra.
144. See Lehnig v. Felton, 235 Pa. Super. Ct. 100, 340 A.2d 564 (1975), vacated, 481 Pa.
557, 393 A.2d 302 (1978); Dubree v. Commonwealth, 8 Pa. Commw. Ct. 567, 303 A.2d 530
(1973), vacated, 481 Pa. 540, 393 A.2d 293 (1978). See notes 88-100 and accompanying text
supra.
immunity implied."' 145
(b) "Low level officials. "--Virtually no criteria exist for defining
a low level official. 4 6 The commonwealth court's extension of con-
ditional immunity to nondiscretionary acts 147 would, however, obvi-
ate a definition of the term "low level" official. If immunity is
available for the negligent performance of discretionary as well as
nondiscretionary acts, it is unnecessary to deny immunity to an em-
ployee simply because he performs only nondiscretionary acts.' 48
The restriction, imposed by Act 152, limiting official immunity to
officials, 49 however, necessitates the definition of a low level official.
To the extent that the policy favoring immunity remains, therefore,
the definition should include only those officials performing func-
tions that would be unduly inhibited by the imposition of liability.'
2. The Discretion Defense. -The defense provided to both offi-
cials and employees engaged in the performance of a discretionary
act immunizes only negligence.' 5 ' Thus, an intentional, malicious,
or wanton act will invoke liability. The purpose of the defense is to
remove the threat of liability by preventing a subsequent evaluation
of an official's conduct by a factfinder.
15 2
By extending the defense to employees, 53 the Act affirms the
functional necessity of immunity as the proper test for determining
entitlement to immunity. The potential hazards of a judicial deter-
mination that the status of the official entitles him to immunity are
145. Dubree v. Commonwealth, 8 Pa. Commw. Ct. 567, 571, 303 A.2d 530, 532 (1973),
vacated 481 Pa. 540, 393 A.2d 293 (1978).
146. The Pennsylvania courts have never explicitly defined the term "low level official."
Sloan, supra note 105, at 213. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in United States ex
rel. Fear v. Rundle, 506 F.2d 331 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied 421 U.S. 1012 (1975), articulated
the typical formulation.
[P]ersons are deemed low officials if they do not have extensive responsibility to fash-
ion public policies, and if their duties and office are, when judged in the broad con-
text of state government in its entirety, not so consistently of public significance as to
warrant the extension to them of an extraordinary and privileged status.
Id at 335. The standard does not, however, serve as a guide for limiting immunity or identify-
ing those entitled to the immunity.
147. See note 80 and accompanying text supra.
148. Because the supreme court, in Dubree v. Commonwealth, 481 Pa. 540, 393 A.2d 293
(1978), intimated that Yealy v. Fink, 43 Pa. 212 (1862), restricted immunity to the performance
of a discretionary act, the question may be moot. See notes 171-74 and accompanying text
infra.
149. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 51 10(b)(1) (Purdon Supp. 1979-80).
150. See notes 7, 31 and 45 and accompanying text supra.
151. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5110(b)(3) (Purdon Supp. 1979-80). See generally
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY, supra note 118, at 18.
152. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY, supra note 118, at 18. See Ammlung v. Platt, 224 Pa. Super.
Ct. 47, 302 A.2d 491 (1973). The defense is identical to the standard of immunity formulated
for public officials in Yealy v. Fink, 43 Pa. 212 (1862), and reaffirmed in Burton v. Fulton, 49
Pa. 151 (1865). See notes 33-38 and accompanying text supra and notes 171-74 and accompa-
nying text infra. Most jurisdictions hold that entitlement to immunity is limited to the perform-
ance of a discretionary act. See Federal Executive Immunity, supra note 6, at 626 n.20.
153. See note 30 and accompanying text supra.
thus avoided. Instead, attention is focused on the nature of the con-
duct and the effect that the imposition of liability could have on the
future performance of the function.
3. The Duty Defense. -An employee may defend an action by
asserting that he acted "pursuant to a duty required by a statute." 54
Although the Act places no restrictions on the situations in which the
defense may be raised, it is unlikely that the courts will view this
provision as an absolute bar to a suit since such an interpretation
would ignore that one may act pursuant to a statute in a grossly neg-
ligent or even malicious fashion. t5 5 If the defense is deemed abso-
lute, moreover, an employee would essentially be granted absolute
immunity.
V. The Implications of Dubree v. Commonwealth
In Dubree v. Commonwealth, 56 a divided 157 supreme court re-
jected status'58 as the sole criterion for determining entitlement to
official immunity. 5 9 Presumptions of either absolute or limited im-
munity, therefore, can no longer be used.'6 ° Instead, courts must de-
154. 42 PA.' CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5110(b)(2) (Purdon Supp. 1979-80).
155. See Freach v. Commonwealth, 471 Pa. 558, 370 A.2d 1163 (1977). But see note 187
and accompanying text infra.
156. 481 Pa. 540, 393 A.2d 293 (1978).
157. Both sovereign and official immunity were at issue in Dubree. On the question of
official immunity the majority consisted of Justices Roberts, O'Brien, Pomeroy, and Larsen,
Justice Nix shared the majority's concern for the preservation of unimpaired decision-making
but dissented because he believed that this could be achieved only by granting immunity to all
public officials. He rejected the argument that an official should be judged by the same stan-
dard of care used to judge employees in the private sector because this would vest a jury with
the authority to rule on the reasonableness of governmental decisions. Id at 552, 393 A.2d at
299-300. See note 169 and accompanying text infra. Chief Justice Eagen also dissented be-
cause he perceived that the majority opinion injected uncertainty and unpredictability into the
determination of immunity. Id at 549, 393 A.2d at 296-98.
158. The supreme court has, in recent years, rejected similar status based immunities.
E.g., Mayle v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Highways, 479 Pa. 384, 388 A.2d 709 (1978) (sovereign
immunity); Ayala v. Philadelphia Bd. of Pub. Educ., 453 Pa. 584, 305 A.2d 877 (1973) (local
government immunity); Falco v. Pados, 444 Pa. 372, 282 A.2d 351 (1971) (parental immunity);
Flagiello v. Pennsylvania Hosp., 417 Pa. 486, 208 A.2d 193 (1965) (charitable immunity).
159. "[Tlhe liability of the individual [defendants] should not have been analyzed solely
on the basis of their status as employees of the Commonwealth." 481 Pa. 540, 543, 393 A.2d
293, 294 (1978) (emphasis added). Dubree did not address the immunity of legislators or
judges.
160. Utilizing a functional analysis of the need for immunity as a supplement to the com-
mon law should obviate the presumption. The apparent purpose of the presumption, see note
87 and accompanying text supra, is to avoid the problem of distinguishing "high" and "low"
level officials and employees. The distinction is virtually impossible to draw because the com-
mon law, which Act 152 purports to adopt, does not define an "official" for the purpose of
immunity. See notes 135 and 146 and accompanying text supra. Moreover, the courts have not
consistently distinguished officers and employees. See notes 127 and 146 and accompanying
text supra.
The restriction, imposed by Act 152, limiting official immunity to officials thus creates
unnecessary problems of definition. See notes 132-50 and accompanying text supra. Presum-
ing the need for immunity on the basis of an undefined status avoids, but does not resolve,
these problems. A functional analysis, however, provides immunity when it is vital to the
proper functioning of government, despite the definitional inadequacies of the Act.
termine the functional necessity of immunity 6' on an individual
basis.
A. Immunity Restricted to Discretionary Acts - Conditional
Immunity
Cognizant of the public's interest in preserving unimpaired de-
cision-making, the Dubree court premised its decision on the belief
that "a public servant must be free to exercise his judgment un-
hampered by the fear of unpredictable liability." 162 Liability is un-
predictable when, because of the legislative or quasi-judicial nature
of an act or decision, it would be impossible 63 or inappropriate' 64 to
submit the act or decision to a judicial determination of reasonable-
ness. Without a defined standard of care against which to measure
his conduct, an official is unable to predetermine the possibility of
liability. This threat of liability would have a chilling effect on the
performance of functions requiring the exercise of judgment.
65
When "a standard of care may be defined and applied with rela-
tive ease,"' 6 6 however, the chilling effect accompanying unpredict-
able liability is absent 167 and the public interest in immunizing the
public servant diminishes.168 When performing a task that does not
require discretionary judgment, an official can adjust his conduct to
the standard of reasonableness used to judge tortious conduct.
169
161. See note 12 and accompanying text supra.
162. 481 Pa. 540, 544, 393 A.2d 293, 295 (1978).
163. Officials performing discretionary functions must frequently take decisive action in
difficult and ambiguous situations. They must be permitted a certain degree of flexibility to
exercise their discretion in choosing among alternate courses of action. Federal Executive Im-
munity, supra note 6, at 633. Thus, it would be virtually impossible to promulgate a rule or
standard of care, other than good faith, that could be applied consistently.
164. The unique treatment accorded discretionary acts has been justified on the basis of
the doctrine of the separation of powers of government. See generally 21 WAYNE L. REV. 1141
(1975). It would be inappropriate for a court to rule on the reasonableness of a decision
reached by a coordinate branch of government. See Federal Executive Immunity, supra note 6,
at 635-36 (criticizing this argument as a justification for absolute immunity). A less desirable
result would permit a jury to be the final arbiter of the reasonableness of a governmental
decision. See Dubree v. Commonwealth, 481 Pa. 540, 552, 393 A.2d 293, 299 (1978) (Nix, J.,
dissenting).
165. Id at 544, 393 A.2d at 295. See note 31 and accompanying text supra.
166. Id at 544, 393 A.2d at 295.
167. Obviously, the threat of liability, predictable or otherwise, will have some effect on
the public servant. One of the purposes of tort liability, however, is to deter wrongdoing.
Vaughn, supra note 52, at 86-87. Thus, the realization that liability has been imposed for
certain misdeeds in the past may deter future occurrences of the same conduct. Id Moreover,
the realization that one may be required to account for his conduct if it deviates from a reason-
able norm is not unique to public employees. It is questionable, therefore, that this fear war-
rants immunity for a public employee while a private citizen is denied similar relief. See Barr
v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 587-89 (1959) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
168. 481 Pa. 540, 544, 393 A.2d 293, 295 (1978).
169. But see Bermann, supra note 96, at 1179 (suggesting that it may be unfair to impose
liability on public officials because there are no civil counterparts to some government posi-
tions). Justice Nix expressed similar sentiments in his dissenting opinion in Dubree.
To argue that the public servant should be held liable to the same standard of his
counterpart in the private sector ignores the distinct differences that exist between the
The court thus presumes that a public servant should assure that his
conduct meets the standard of care typically required of a private
citizen. '
70
The court does not utilize the terms "discretionary" and "non-
discretionary." The dichotomy between predictable and unpredict-
able standards of care, 17 1 however, achieves essentially the same
result. The "discretionary" exception to liability was developed be-
cause of the courts' inability to judge the reasonableness of particu-
lar conduct.'72 The Dubree formula restricts immunity to conduct
that would be threatened with unpredictable liability because of the
difficulties attendant to a determination of reasonability. 173 Regard-
less of the label used, therefore, conduct formerly styled discretion-
ary will continue to receive unique judicial treatment.
174
By reimposing a "discretionary" requirement for entitlement to
immunity, the court soundly rejects the conclusion of the lower
courts that the policy supporting immunity is apposite to all conduct
of public servants. 75 The problem of distinguishing between discre-
tionary and nondiscretionary acts, however, remains. 76 Although
two. Liability predicated upon the principles of respondeat superior or allegations of
negligence because of inadequate supervision must reflect the dilution of control of
the conduct of a subordinate in the public sector because of the restrictions imposed
by civil service and tenure laws ....
[I]t is not valid to conclude that the procedure employed to judge the action of
one in the private sector is appropriate [to judge the conduct of a public official]. It is
one thing to allow a jury to determine that a private defendant did or did not act
reasonably, it is quite another to permit a jury to have the final say as to the reasona-
bleness of the acts of public officials in the exercise of their authority and discretion.
481 Pa. at 552, 393 A.2d at 299 (Nix, J., dissenting).
170. The Dubree court expresely rejected the possibility of imposing vicarious liability on
an official because of the misconduct of his subordinates. 481 Pa. at 545, 393 A.2d at 295. See,
e.g., Ostoich v. Wilson, - Pa. Commw. Ct. -, 406 A.2d 1200 (1979); Snow v. Pastories, - Pa.
Commw. Ct. -, 405 A.2d 1114 (1979). Moreover, since immunity will be granted to an official
performing a discretionary act, see notes 172-75 and accompanying text infra, the differences
between public and private employees may not be sufficient to warrant unique judicial treat-
ment.
171. See notes 162-68 and accompanying text supra.
172. See American Pavement Co. v. Wagner, 139 Pa. 623, 21 A. 160 (1891); Burton v.
Fulton, 49 Pa. 151 (1865); Yealy v. Fink, 43 Pa. 212 (1862); Ammlung v. Platt, 224 Pa. Super.
Ct. 47, 302 A. 2d 491 (1973).
173. To illustrate the type of conduct to which the exception should apply, the Dubree
panel relied on Yealy v. Fink, 43 Pa. 212 (1862). Yealy stood for the proposition that the
legislative nature of certain conduct renders it an inappropriate subject for judicial review and
an appropriate subject for immunity. See notes 33-35 and accompanying text supra.
174. See note 8 supra. The court's reference to Yeal, to illustrate this point apparently
reaffirms the validity of the malicious, wanton, or reckless standard invoked in Yealy and
reaffirmed in Burton v. Fulton, 49 Pa. 151 (1865). See notes 36-38 and accompanying text
supra.
175. See notes 79-81 and accompanying text supra. The argument that the lower court
decisions represent the common law as codified by Act 152 is without merit. Burton v. Fulton,
49 Pa. 151 (1865), and Yealy v. Fink, 43 Pa. 212 (1862), represent the supreme court's final
word on the "discretion" requirement prior to the Dubree decision. Thus, enactment of Act
152 should not preclude the court from reaffirming the validity of its earlier position and
reimposing a "discretionary" requirement for entitlement to immunity. See note 120 and ac-
companying text supra.
176. The distinction is necessitated not only by the Dubree formulation of official immu-
the courts will not be required to label conduct " discretionary" or
"nondiscretionary," a distinction must be drawn between conduct
that is susceptible to judicial review and conduct that is not. Since
this determination is necessarily made after the challenged act has
been committed, a public servant will not be assured of immunity.
Because of the strict interpretation of immunity in Dubree, however,
presumably only governmental decision-making will remain sacro-
sanct.
B. The Effect of Dubree on Absolute Immunity
The standard to be used as a touchstone for determining entitle-
ment to immunity is admittedly vague. "Where. . .no public pol-
icy would be promoted in shielding a defendant from liability...
denial of the possibility of recovery is unjustified." ''  The standard
does, however, clearly indicate that absolute immunity, as applied by
the lower courts since Jonnet v. Bodick, '78 will no longer exist since a
case-by-case analysis of the necessity of immunity is incompatible
with complete immunity from suit.
The policy argument consistently relied upon as justification for
absolute immunity, however, is the public interest in ensuring the
unfettered discharge of official duties. 7 9 This same policy served as
the premise of the Dubree decision. Thus, an analysis of the purpose
of absolute immunity is necessary to determine whether the Dubree
standard of immunity is inconsistent with the doctrine of official im-
munity codified by Act 152.180
The purpose of absolute immunity is to foreclose inquiry into
the motives that impelled an official to act in a particular manner.' 8
Because the courts are incapable of separating meritorious claims of
malice from spurious claims, 182 proponents of absolute immunity ar-
gue that nothing less than complete immunity from suit is accepta-
nity but also by the inclusion of a "discretion" defense in Act 152. See notes 151-53 and
accompanying text supra. The inadequacies of the discretionary-ministerial distinction are
thus retained. See note 8 supra.
177. Dubree v. Commonwealth, 481 Pa. 540, 546, 393 A.2d 293, 296 (1978).
178. 431 Pa. 59, 244 A.2d 751 (1968). See notes 64-71 and 91-99 and accompanying text
supra.
179. See, e.g., Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 571-73 (1959); Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483
(1896); Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949 (1950);
Montgomery v. City of Philadelphia, 392 Pa. 178, 140 A.2d 100 (1958).
180. See notes 15 and 132 and accompanying text supra.
181. Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949), cert denied, 339 U.S. 949 (1950).
182. It does indeed go without saying that an official, who is in fact guilty of using his
power to vent his spleen upon others, or for any other personal motive not connected
with the public good, should not escape liability. . . .[I]f it were possible ... to
confine such complaints to the guilty, it would be monstrous to deny recovery. The
justification for doing so is that it is impossible to know whether the claim is well
founded until the case has been tried. . . .[T]o submit all officials, the innocent as
well as the guilty, to the burden of a trial. . . would dampen the ardor of all but the
most resolute, or the most irresponsible, in the unflinching discharge of their duties.
id
ble. Thus, the public interest demands that corrupt officials be
accommodated so that sincere officials who commit a simple mistake
of judgment will not be subjected to a jury trial on the propriety of
their motives.
The argument in favor of this prophylactic approach is uncon-
vincing. 183 The courts routinely dismiss complaints because they fail
to state a cause of action and summary judgment is available to a
defendant against whom a frivolous suit is brought. 84 If the case is
litigated, moreover, a plaintiff charging an official with a corrupt or
malicious motive will be confronted with the burdens of proof and
persuasion on the issue of malice."8 5 Thus, if it is necessary to fore-
close inquiry into an official's motive, it should be accomplished by
less inclusive means.
The Dubree standard is less inclusive and a more flexible gauge
of liability. This flexibility is necessary because the public interest in
protecting the official varies, depending upon the nature of the con-
duct and the nature of the injury involved. I" 6 The public interest
183. See notes 52 and 77 and accompanying text supra. The validity of the argument that
the courts are incapable of distinguishing meritorious and frivolous claims of malice is ques-
tionable. Courts are obliged to make the identical distinction in suits against "low" level offi-
cials who are immune unless malice is proved.
Less convincing is the argument that a public official will be unable to function in his
official capacity unless he is assured, in advance, that immunity will insulate his motives from
judicial scrutiny. But see Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 527 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissent-
ing). The public may be willing to tolerate mistakes in judgment rather than suffering the
effects of an over-cautious government. It is ludicrous, however, to suggest that the public
should tolerate corrupt public officials to avoid intimidating officials with the threat that they
will be required to account for their corrupt acts. See James, Tort Liability of Governmental
Units, 22 U. CHi. L. REv. 610, 647 (1965).
184. The judicial process will prevent an unsubstantiated claim for relief from proceeding
beyond the pleading stage. Although the complaint may allege malice in general terms, PA. R.
Civ. P. 1019(b), the defendant is entitled to a more specific pleading. Id at 1017(b)(3). The
pleadings should raise at least three issues: first, whether the defendant acted within the scope
of his authority; second, whether he acted within the range of discretion permitted by law; and
last, whether he acted with a corrupt or malicious motive.
If no genuine issue exists, the defendant is entitled to summary judgment.
[Summary judgment] shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to inter-
rogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits. . . show that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.
Id at 1035(b).
[The party opposing the motion for summary judgment] may not rest upon the mere
allegations or denials of his pleadings, but his response . . . must set forth specific
facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, sum-
mary judgment shall be entered against him.
Id at 1035(d). Thus, a frivolous claim will not be litigated.
185. In addition, Act 152 partially relieves the burden of a trial. When an official or em-
ployee is sued pursuant to the provisions of the act, he is entitled to legal assistance by the
Attorney General. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5110(c) (Purdon Supp. 1979-80). Legal assist-
ance and the cost of legal assistance are denied if the official is sued because of an act or
omission beyond the scope of his authority. Id If, however, the official successfully defends
the action on the basis that it was an act within the scope of his authority, the state will reim-
burse him for the cost of his legal defense. Id
186. "The character and severity of an individual's injury is an important consideration in
a determination regarding the immunity of public employees." Ammlung v. Platt, 224 Pa.
Super. Ct. 47, 58 n.31, 302 A.2d 491, 497 n.31 (1973). See, e.g., Jaffee, supra note 8, at 219.
may be intense when an official is charged with malice because of his
compliance with a duty.'87 This interest may diminish, however,
when an official's alleged misconduct causes serious injury'88 or
death. 89 Because an inquiry into the official's status may not reflect
the public interest in protecting the official, the Dubree analysis does
not end with the determination of status. The Dubree standard per-
mits the court' 90 to decide whether the nature of the official's con-
duct, the nature of the charge against him, and the potential impact
on the future performance of the function from an inquiry into mo-
tive warrant complete immunity.
The Dubree standard does not assure an official that he will be
completely free from the threat of suit. This assurance, however, is
not available under either the three-pronged test'91 of Montgomery v.
City ofPhiladeolhia9 2 or the wholly status based formula utilized in
decisions subsequent to Jonnet v. Bodick. "I By predicating the stan-
dard upon the nature of the conduct as well as the public interest in
protecting the officer, however, the Dubree standard more closely ap-
proximates the public policy that immunity is intended to serve. The
supreme court's pronouncement in Dubree is therefore a necessary
refinement of the immunity doctrine codified by Act 152. It compen-
sates for the definitional inadequacies of the Act and obviates the ill-
conceived presumption of immunity. 94
Compare Montgomery v. City of Philadelphia, 392 Pa. 178, 140 A.2d 100 (1958), and Matson
v. Margiotti, 371 Pa. 188, 88 A.2d 892 (1952) with Brungard v. Hartman, 483 Pa. 200, 394 A.2d
1265 (1978), and Dubree v. Commonwealth, 481 Pa. 540, 393 A.2d 293 (1978).
187. In Matson v. Margiotti, 371 Pa. 188, 88 A.2d 892 (1952), the court held that it was the
Attorney General's duty to inform a district attorney that an assistant district attorney was
involved with communist organizations. The court, therefore, concluded that the Attorney
General's motive for doing so was irrelevant. Id at 198, 88 A.2d at 899.
The Matson case has been justified as a proper extension of the policy-based immunity of
judges. See notes 25-29 and accompanying text supra. It is the prosecutor's duty to uphold the
laws and prosecute those who violate the laws. If, however, the prosecutor is threatened with
retaliatory suits, he may be loath to initiate proceedings against persons guilty of crimes. Pub-
lic safety may be jeopardized if the prosecution becomes overly cautious. But see Handler &
Klein, supra note 29, at 64 (criticizing Matson because the Attorney General was not subject to
the same restraints that prevent abuse of power by judges).
188. Brungard v. Hartman, 483 Pa. 200, 394 A.2d 1265 (1978); Heifetz v. Philadelphia
State Hosp., 482 Pa. 386, 393 A.2d 1160 (1978).
189. Lehnig v. Felton, 481 Pa. 557, 393 A.2d 302 (1978); Dubree v. Commonwealth, 481
Pa. 540, 393 A.2d 293 (1978).
190. Immunity from suit is raised as a preliminary objection in the nature of a demurrer
upon which the court must rule. PA. R. CIV. P. 1028(c). The Dubree standard provides addi-
tional criteria upon which the court may base its ruling.
191. See notes 59-60 and 132-43 and accompanying text supra.
192. 392 Pa. 178, 140 A.2d 100 (1958).
193. 431 Pa. 59, 244 A.2d 751 (1968). See notes 64-71 and accompanying text supra. An
official's status may not entitle him to absolute immunity. Admittedly, this possibility is mini-
mized when the courts presume immunity from suit rather than examining the official's status.
See notes 91-99 and accompanying text supra.
194. See note 160 and accompanying text supra.
VI. Conclusion
The Pennsylvania doctrine of official immunity is a necessary
means of insuring the effective functioning of government. The sta-
tus based test formerly utilized by the courts to determine entitle-
ment to the immunity, however, is both inadequate and
unnecessarily broad. The functional necessity 9 5 test is more appro-
priate. A functional analysis of the need for immunity accommo-
dates both the public interest in preserving unimpaired decision-
making and a plaintiff's interest in securing justice.
The functional nature of the Dubree standard of immunity is,
moreover, compatible with Act 152. The "discretion" defense pro-
vided by Act 152196 is identical to the formulation of conditional im-
munity adopted by the Dubree court. The flexibility of the Dubree
standard will accommodate the "duty" defense' 9 7 with less difficulty
than might be encountered with a pure status analysis.
Although a functional test precludes an absolute bar to suit,
Dubree and Act 152 are not irreconcilable. If circumstances reveal
the need to prevent the trier of fact from inquiring into the official's
motive, a functional analysis will permit this result, regardless of the
official's high or low status. In this respect, a functional analysis of-
fers protection superior to that available under a purely status based
approach and, therefore, to the extent that Jonnet v. Bodick is incon-
sistent with this approach, it should be overruled.
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195. See note 12 and accompanying text supra.
196. See notes 151-53 and accompanying text supra.
197. See notes 154-55 and accompanying text supra.

